保庇次級金融市場的土地廟哪時蓋好? 談催生融資公司法! When will the protection umbrella for the secondary financial market be built? On the push for the Financing Company Acts!

正體中文|English

國內知名藝廊「帝門藝術中心」負責人陳女士因無力負擔地下錢莊高利貸並不堪威脅羞辱催討而燒炭自裁，討債公司負責人在日前(12/10)遭警方逮捕。但往者已矣，地下金融的憾事又添一樁。

 

僅不過在一個多月之前(10/27)，由台大財金所所長黃達業教授領軍的「財經立法監督聯盟」假立法院召開「融資法公聽會」，希望可以催生「融資公司法」在立法院第7屆第4會期三讀。不過社會大眾可能不知道的是「融資公司法草案」早在民國79年即在行政機關草擬完成，苦蹲寒窯18年後總算在去年的立法院第7屆第1會期完成二讀，尚缺臨門一腳；融資公司在美國、日本、香港、新加坡均備有專法加以管理，其中美國的奇異融資服務公司(GE Capital Service)總資產更高居美國金融產業(含銀行)的前五大，對照我國對融資公司的消極管理，反差甚大；但最令人憂心的是目前立法修正的方向，可能更有抑制合法的融資公司發展，變相鼓勵地下金融壯大的反效果。

 

目前「融資公司法草案」的法案缺失，謹藉 貴刊提出拙見觀點說明：

 

一、        主管機關錯置：融資公司適合低度監理，主管機關以經濟部為宜，而非高度監理的金管會。融資公司與銀行，都是藉由貸放資金與風險管理取得營利報酬，但最大相異處是銀行接受非金融專業的大眾存款取得資金，需藉由高度監理來保障專業不足的社會大眾存款安全；融資公司以股東資金與向批發銀行取得資金營運，沒有前述社會風險，以維持市場經濟自由度的低度監理即敷政府管控風險。

另外，融資公司資金經常大部分來自批發銀行，可知商品利率很難與銀行競爭，所以客戶是以銀行不能服務的客戶為主，通常也是信用次佳的客層。與其說融資產業是Non-bank bank(不是銀行的銀行)，倒不如說是Over-banking比較貼切。利率已不擅與銀行競爭的融資公司再接受高度監理增加管理成本，只會讓合法的融資公司更難生存，繼續助長地下金融。

扁政府時代將融資公司法主管機關指定為金管會，並擬藉由高額資本額等門檻，讓融資公司實質成為銀行業的禁臠，筆者比較懷疑與扁政府想藉由金融產業整併為吳、辜、蔡與公營行庫形成寡占「白銀帝國」藉以操控圖利有關。

相對於前朝官員的怪異行徑，筆者忍俊不住要推崇前任行政院邱正雄副院長。邱副院長出身銀行業，能不囿於己身的經驗與既成利益，洞察融資公司法「殺雞焉用牛刀」，由經濟部管理即可的本質，不和稀泥指示相關部會再研議。如果邱副院長未因風災內閣總辭，融資公司法應有一番新的面貌。

也有許多專家主張，尤其是銀行業也樂觀其成，就是服務信用次佳的客戶，只要銀行降低監理門檻，將原來拒絕的客戶收納進來即可。但事實證明降低監理門檻，是整個銀行業的系統風險提升，所以像王玉雲、王又曾、許勝發經營的體質不良企業可以藉由自己開設銀行取得資金，最後是拿納稅人的錢成立千億規模的RTC幫幾個大老闆還債；銀行爭相發行現金卡造成雙卡風暴，證明低度監理的銀行與低度監理的融資公司管理效率很難說孰有上下，但銀行虧損倒閉的社會成本遠高於融資公司。所以我們可以更驚世駭俗地說，造成近十年金融體系大亂的遠因，與缺乏融資公司法管理的成熟融資產業補強金融體系不足，至為相關。

 

二、        金融商品法定利率上限調低至12.5%。請恕筆者直言，這是頭痛醫頭喊爽耍狠的民粹，不是有利社會大眾的政策。若果真修法立法通過，我們社會將付出的代價是：

1.      小額消費融資市場萎縮。道理很簡單，一般消費者如果只需一萬元以下的融資，無論是銀行或是融資公司處理每件客戶融資的徵信與帳務管理成本至少在數百元以上，再計入資本利率、客戶風險等成本因素，即使無利可圖也很容易觸法。小額融資又以社會弱勢族群為主，規定利率上限反而限縮弱勢朋友的融資管道。

2.      法律恆常性遭到破壞。只要大家回想經濟高成長的民國80年代，美國的房貸利率約在16%的水準，我國的房貸利率可維持在8%，但信用貸款利率也逼近15%。這幾年維持經濟榮景的大陸，個人融資管道很有限，公司法人融資利率在浙江地區達20%，在金融環境競爭激烈的上海據聞還有利率50%成交的融資個案。除非國人與立法機關大家都認定台灣經濟環境永遠一蹶不振，否則每十年一波的經濟熱潮來臨，市場資金緊俏，屆時發現利率上限12.5%限制太多，同樣的民粹又要上演一次，是否這種無謂的立法資源浪費真有必要？

3.      變相鼓勵地下金融。金融商品根據消費者或公司法人需求，因融資額度、期數、風險組合不同，商品利率當然也不相同。當合法融資業者有商品利率限制，不是迫使合法業者巧立名目矇騙客戶與監理機關，就是強迫有需求的消費者和法人轉向地下業者求助。

綜合考量法律的恆常性，且保護一般金融知識不足的社會大眾，又能維護市場經濟的自由彈性，看來只需維持民法重利罪條文不變，融資公司法專法放寬對法人的放款利率限制，社會可享最佳綜合利益。

 

三、        融資業者無法成為聯徵中心(JCIC)會員查詢客戶信用資料。原草案內容既然要對融資公司採取高度監理，卻又不給予融資公司有效管理客戶風險的工具，在邏輯上已不免貲議。尤其是金控公司可以藉由個人資料保護法的巧門，融資子公司可以藉由銀行子公司取得聯徵資訊，造成實質不公平競爭，讓人想像空間更大。更令人費解的是信用卡公司其實就是融資公司，搭銀行信用卡業務解釋之便順利成為JCIC會員，其它融資公司有相同需求卻被拒門外。

上述觀點是質疑立法的公平正義。另一方面，融資業者若能加入聯徵中心，除了與現有銀行、農會、信用卡公司一起分攤作業成本，可期望將金融產業的徵信費用略微降低的小惠之外，更大的利益是降低整體金融產業的系統風險。當融資業者與銀行業者使用獨立不往來的徵信資料庫，市場即曝露在消費者與法人客戶多重負債卻無法掌握的資訊風險。看來開放融資業者加入聯徵中心，對社會公眾似乎較為有利。  

 

融資公司法就像是保佑次級金融市場的土地公廟：沒有土地公來保庇管理，讓地下金融置身法外造成憾事不斷，一般公司行號也可用租賃、附條件買賣(分期付款)、應收帳款收買等交易型式販售融資商品服務，僅能仰賴公司法來稍事管理；國外先進國家都有專法而我們沒有，已經令人感到慚愧；這座廟建了快20年還沒蓋好，令人匪夷所思；若立法方向錯誤最後蓋成一幢無法使用的違章建築，相信是大家非常不樂見的結果。筆者冒昧以淺薄的知識經驗提出看法，希望拋磚引玉，吸引社會大眾、專家學者、政府行政立法機構的高見與關注，能制定為整體金融產業發揮更大綜效的融資公司專法。除開上述不敬的批評，現版「融資公司法草案」對於融資商品利率的誠實標示、催收流程的管理、不良債權的轉讓限制等，均有符合公眾利益、有效解決亂象的精彩條文規範。至於其它細節部分，還有6個作業層次的議題，值得留待產官學界研究討論協商後，再有定案：

 

一、        融資公司法管理的對象與業務範圍，是否需納入信用卡與相關衍生性業務、創投公司、租賃公司等……

 

二、        為鼓勵現有業者合法經營，降低地下金融規模，融資公司設立資本額似以低門檻設計較佳。

 

三、        部分融資公司有成為跨國與上市大型企業的發展潛力，若經營不善或倒閉，仍足以傷害金融市場安定。對於虧損達資本額1/2等重大訊息，似宜立法強制揭露，以利相關政府單位管制處理。

 

四、        金融商品的債權標的物或質押品，許多無法藉由設定讓債權人確保債權，甚或債務人將標的物或質押品出租給善意第三人，基於買賣不破租賃原則使債權人無法處分造成損失。因此由融資、租賃，甚或與銀行業者籌建質押品的公示系統資料庫，或可解決部分爭端。

 

五、        融資公司與從業人員採特許執照制。在信用貸款與抵押貸款方面，融資公司仍不免與銀行有業務競爭關係，為避免不當的價格競爭與浮濫授信爭奪市場，適量管制執照證照，似乎利多於弊。

 

六、        無照經營融資業務的自然人與法人，應有處罰機制，以降低地下金融規模，逐年減少爭端憾事發生。

 

謹冀望有識之士能發揮臨門一腳，並且是功夫內力十足的漂亮得分，為融資公司專法催生，並藉此呵護庇佑次級金融市場與整體金融產業！

Ms. Chen, the head of the renowned local gallery Dimen Art Center, recently took her own life by carbon monoxide poisoning, unable to bear the burden of high-interest loans from underground money lenders and the relentless harassment of debt collectors. The head of the debt collection company was arrested by the police on December 10. However, this tragedy adds yet another sorrowful chapter to the issue of underground finance.

Just over a month prior, on October 27, Professor Huang Daye, head of NTU’s Finance Institute, led the "Financial Legislation Monitoring Alliance" in holding a public hearing on the Financing Company Act at the Legislative Yuan, aiming to pass the bill in the fourth session of the Seventh Legislative Yuan. Yet, the public may not be aware that the draft of this act was completed by administrative agencies as early as 1990, and it finally reached a second reading in the first session of the Seventh Legislative Yuan last year, needing only one more step for full approval. In the U.S., Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, financing companies are regulated by dedicated laws. The U.S. company GE Capital Service, for instance, ranks among the top five in American financial assets, surpassing many banks—showing a stark contrast to Taiwan’s passive approach to financing companies. The greatest concern, however, lies in the current legislative direction, which risks inhibiting legitimate financing companies and inadvertently fostering the growth of underground finance.

In light of the deficiencies in the Financing Company Act draft, I offer my humble views for consideration by your esteemed publication.

 

A.      Misplacement of Regulatory Authority: Financing companies are better suited for minimal supervision and should fall under the Ministry of Economic Affairs rather than the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), which is designed for highly regulated entities. While both banks and financing companies generate profits through loans and risk management, the key difference is that banks accept deposits from the general public, who may lack financial expertise, requiring tight supervision to protect these deposits. Financing companies, on the other hand, operate using shareholder capital and wholesale bank funds, which poses no such societal risk. Therefore, maintaining low levels of regulatory oversight is sufficient to manage government risks while upholding market economic freedom.

Additionally, financing companies rely primarily on funds from wholesale banks, meaning it’s hard for them to compete with banks in terms of interest rates. Their customers are often those who banks refuse to serve, typically higher-risk borrowers. Rather than viewing financing companies as "non-bank banks," it's more accurate to see them as “over-banking.” Imposing high levels of regulation would raise costs, making it difficult for legal financing companies to survive and encouraging the growth of underground finance.

During the Chen administration, the FSC was designated as the regulatory authority for financing companies, with plans to impose high capital requirements to essentially block their operations, potentially in pursuit of consolidating the financial sector into an oligopoly controlled by a few major players, such as the Wu, Koo, and Tsai families, along with state-run banks. In contrast to such dubious moves by former officials, I must commend former Deputy Premier Chiou I-jen. Chiou, with a background in banking, recognized the need for minimal regulatory involvement in financing companies and instructed the relevant departments to re-evaluate the regulatory approach. Had Chiou not resigned with the cabinet due to the typhoon, the Financing Company Act might have seen a brighter future.

Some experts and members of the banking sector have suggested that banks simply lower their regulatory thresholds to take on customers rejected by financing companies. However, loosening these regulatory standards heightens systemic risk across the banking industry. Poorly managed companies run by individuals such as Wang Yung-ching and Wang You-tseng exploited this leniency, eventually requiring taxpayer-funded bailouts amounting to hundreds of billions. The “dual card crisis” resulting from aggressive credit card issuance further shows that lower regulatory standards do not equate to better management efficiency. Bank failures have far greater social costs than those of financing companies, underscoring the need for a mature financing industry to fill gaps in the financial system and mitigate these risks.

B.      Lowering the Legal Interest Rate Cap for Financial Products to 12.5%: This populist approach, which superficially addresses financial concerns without benefiting society, would, if passed, impose the following costs:

·         Shrinking the Microloan Market: For small loans, generally below NT$10,000, the cost of conducting credit checks and managing accounts is already several hundred dollars per transaction for banks or financing companies. Factoring in capital rates and risk costs, the ceiling would severely limit viable loan options, especially for disadvantaged groups who depend on small loans, ultimately restricting their financial access.

·         Disruption of Legal Stability: During the high-growth 1990s, U.S. mortgage rates hovered around 16%, with Taiwanese mortgage rates at 8% and personal loan rates nearing 15%. Mainland China’s booming economy has limited personal loan channels, with corporate rates reaching 20% in Zhejiang and even 50% for some loans in Shanghai. Unless Taiwan’s economic environment is expected to remain stagnant indefinitely, any future economic boom would again necessitate higher rates, resulting in needless, cyclical policy changes.

·         Encouraging Underground Finance: Financial products vary in rates based on customer needs, loan amounts, and risk levels. Legal financing companies facing interest rate limits would be forced to either circumvent regulations through opaque practices or lose business to underground financiers. Maintaining stable, protective laws for general public finance knowledge while safeguarding free-market flexibility suggests that upholding the Civil Law’s usury provisions without further loan rate caps for corporations offers the greatest social benefit.

C.      Financing Companies’ Inability to Access the Joint Credit Information Center (JCIC) for Credit Checks: The draft of the Financing Company Act seeks tight regulation of financing companies yet fails to provide tools for effective credit risk management. Financial holding companies can access JCIC data through bank subsidiaries, leading to an uneven playing field. Moreover, credit card companies, which are essentially financing companies, can join the JCIC, but other financing companies with the same needs are excluded.

Allowing financing companies to join the JCIC would not only reduce credit-checking costs for banks, cooperatives, and credit card companies but also reduce systemic risk by preventing financing companies and banks from using disconnected data sources, which exposes the market to untraceable multiple debt scenarios. Granting JCIC membership to financing companies appears to be in the public’s best interest.

 

The Financing Company Act serves as the guardian deity temple for the secondary financial market. Without this guardian, unregulated underground finance has led to numerous tragedies, and general businesses can only rely on the Company Act for minimal oversight of financing services like leasing, installment sales, and accounts receivable purchases. It is regrettable that, unlike advanced countries with specialized laws, Taiwan lacks such a framework, and after nearly 20 years, this "temple" remains unfinished. It would be disappointing if a misguided legislative approach resulted in an unusable, makeshift regulatory structure. With humble knowledge, I present these thoughts in the hope of inspiring broader social, expert, and governmental insight to establish a more effective and comprehensive Financing Company Act for the financial industry.

Beyond this critical perspective, the current Financing Company Act draft includes commendable regulations, such as transparent interest rate disclosures, managed debt collection processes, and limitations on non-performing loan transfers, all of which align with public interests and address market irregularities effectively. However, the following six areas remain open for industry-government-academic collaboration and discussion:

A.     Scope of Supervision under the Act: Should this include credit card-related and derivative services, venture capital companies, leasing companies, and others?

B.      Capital Requirements: To encourage legal operation and reduce underground finance, a lower capital threshold may be preferable.

C.      Disclosure of Financial Risks: Large financing companies with cross-border or public market presence could destabilize the financial market if poorly managed or bankrupt. Legislation should mandate disclosure of significant events, such as losses exceeding half of capital, to assist regulatory authorities in managing risk.

D.     Debt and Collateral Security: Many financial product claims and collateral cannot ensure creditor protection due to issues like debtors leasing pledged assets to third parties under the principle that "sales do not invalidate leases," which may lead to creditor losses. Establishing a publicly accessible collateral information database with input from financing, leasing, and banking industries could help resolve such disputes.

E.      Licensing System for Financing Companies and Employees: Since financing companies compete with banks in credit and secured lending, moderate licensing restrictions could help prevent destructive price competition and irresponsible lending.

F.      Penalties for Unlicensed Financing: A penalty mechanism for individuals and entities conducting unlicensed financing would help curb underground finance and reduce recurring disputes and tragedies.

I hope that capable individuals will provide a well-timed, strong finishing touch to successfully establish this specialized Financing Company Act, protecting and fostering the secondary financial market and the broader financial industry.